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Sullivan v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61, 96 P.3d 761 (2004)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order denying appellant’s post-conviction petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus to consider whether the district court’s entry of an amended judgment of 
conviction provided good cause to extend the one-year limitation set forth in NEV. REV. STAT. 
34.726(1) for filing a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The district court’s order denying the post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus 
was affirmed. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On January 7, 1998, Sullivan pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery, burglary, and 
possession of stolen property.  The original judgment of conviction contained a clerical error 
because it mistakenly pronounced Sullivan guilty of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, 
when Sullivan had only pleaded guilty to simply robbery.  On appeal, the judgment of conviction 
was confirmed, but the case was remanded to the district court in order to correct the mistake.  A 
corrected judgment of conviction was entered on January 3, 2000 before the remittitur from the 
Nevada Supreme Court to correct the judgment issued on January 10, 2000. 
 On May 10, 001, Sullivan filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  
The State moved to dismiss the petition because it was untimely.  However, the parties then 
decided to stipulate that Sullivan’s supplemental petition should be treated as timely because it  
was filed within one year of the when the amended judgment was actually entered.  The petition 
was ultimately denied after the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and this appeal by 
Sullivan followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Even though the timeliness of the filing of the petition had been stipulated to by the 
parties, the Nevada Supreme Court discussed whether Sullivan’s post-conviction habeas petition 
was procedurally barred.  The court first looked to NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) which provides 
that a timely post-conviction habeas petition “must be filed within 1 year after entry of the 
judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the 
Supreme Court issues its remittitur.”  There is no language in the statute that addresses whether 
the one-year time period restarts if the judgment of conviction is amended.  Therefore, the court 
found that to provide an extended period of time under NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 would create an 
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absurd result that could not have been intended by the legislature.2  A district court may amend a 
judgment years and even decades after the original judgment of conviction is entered which 
would then restart the one-year time period.  This would undermine the doctrine of finality of 
judgments by providing virtually no end to the filing of post-conviction habeas petitions. 
 When the Nevada Legislature enacted NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726, the “overall spirit was 
one of limiting habeas petitioners to one time through the [post-conviction] system absent 
extraordinary circumstances.”3  Therefore, NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) requires that claims 
presented in an untimely post-conviction habeas petition must be dismissed as procedurally 
barred “unless there is good cause shown for the delay.”4  Sullivan failed to show good reason 
for the delay in filing the petition.  Here, the claims were not related to and did not contest the 
clerical correction contained in the amended judgment of conviction.  Instead, they all arose 
during the original proceedings and thus they could have been raised in a timely petition filed on 
or before January 10, 2001 which is one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issued the 
remittitur in the direct appeal.  Therefore, the petition was improperly treated as timely under 
NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 simply because it was filed within one year of the entry of the amended 
judgment of conviction notwithstanding the stipulation that the petition would be allowed 
entered into by both parties. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court denied Sullivan’s petition for habeas corpus and the Nevada Supreme 
Court affirmed, stating that the petition was untimely because it was filed approximately 14 
months after the supreme court had issued a remittitur in the inmate’s direct appeal.  Thus, the 
petition was improperly treated as timely under NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726 simply because it was 
filed within one year of the entry of the amended judgment.  Additionally, even it the petition 
had been timely filed, Sullivan’s petition lacked merit because his guilty pleas were knowing and 
voluntary and his counsel was not ineffective. 
 
                                                 
2 See Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (1998). 
3 Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 875, 34 P.3d 519, 529 (2001). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. 34.726(1) provides in pertinent part that “For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for 
delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court: (a) That the delay is not the fault of the 
petitioner; and (b) That dismissal of the petition as untimely will unduly prejudice the petitioner. 
